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THE TREASURY'S TWENTY YEAR BATTLE
WITH TREATY SHOPPING: ARTICLE 16 OF
THE 1977 UNITED STATES MODEL TREATY
Robert R. Oliva*
A nonresident alien individual1 may reduce his United States
federal tax from the thirty percent bracket' to zero percent in
some cases3 merely by forming a foreign corporation," which also
may be called a treaty corporation, in a foreign country which has
a tax treaty' with the United States. That individual's overall tax
liability can be further reduced if he incorporates in a foreign
country which offers a relatively low tax burden.6 For some indi-
viduals, forming a treaty corporation in a treaty country for tax
advantages is an acceptable form of international tax planning. To
others, such as the United States Treasury Department (the Trea-
sury), this practice is known as "treaty shopping" and is an unin-
tended benefit7 of this country's tax policies.
*Assistant Professor, Florida International University; B.S. 1967, Florida Atlantic Univer-
sity; J.D. 1980, Whittier College; LL.M. 1983, University of San Diego; Member, Florida Bar
and California Bar.
While the reference is to alien individuals, the discussion is also applicable to foreign
corporations.
2 The tax bracket reference is to the United States withholding tax. Generally speaking,
there is a thirty percent withholding tax on income not connected with a trade or a business.
See I.R.C. §§ 861, 861(a)(4), 871(a)(1)(A), and 872(a)(1)(1976).
3 There are approximately eighteen tax treaties that completely exempt interest pay-
ments from withholding. See Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 29, 1948,
United States-Netherlands, art. VIII, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, Additional Protocol,
15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665. There are approximately thirty tax treaties that exempt
payment of royalties from withholding. See id. art. IX.
' A foreign corporation is one formed under the laws of a foreign country. I.R.C. §
7701(a)(5)(1976).
' Tax treaties are also known as tax conventions. This paper will make references to con-
ventions, tax treaties, or simply to treaties.
' For instance, under the Netherlands Antilles' National Ordinance on Profit Tax of 1940,
investment companies, financial holding companies, and patent holding companies are taxed
at ten percent of the "old" corporation rate which is between two and two-tenths percent
and three percent. 263 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-11(1982).
" The term "unintended benefit" will be used throughout the article. In this context, the
term means any benefit that is derived by a resident of a third country through the use of a
tax treaty. See infra notes 36, 47, 52, 53, and 54.
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One provision, Article 16 of the United States Model Treaty"
(1977 U.S. Model), attempts to deal with the practice of treaty
shopping and is the subject matter of this paper. Article 16 ex-
cludes treaty corporations from benefits when those corporations
enjoy special tax benefits in the treaty country" or when those cor-
poratibns are owned by a substantial number of shareholders who
are not residents of either treaty country (third country resi-
dents).10 The first test of exclusion is the "preferred tax rate" test;
the second test of exclusion is the "ownership" or "control" test."
In June 1981, the Treasury announced a proposed new draft (the
June draft) of Article 16 that apparently responded to the exten-
sive use12 and abuse of tax treaties by third country residents. 3
The June draft was the most encompassing version of Article 16
ever formulated, because it denied tax treaty benefits to treaty cor-
porations that had borrowed substantial amounts of capital from
third country residents." With the announcement of the June
draft the Treasury initiated a new period of development in the
evolution of Article 16.
After the announcement of the June draft, the United States
Senate had an opportunity to indicate its views regarding Article
16 during the ratification process of the Argentina tax treaty. 5 In
8 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 153 (May 7, 1977). A model treaty is one that has been an-
nounced or adopted by a country, such as the United States Model Treaty, or by an organi-
zation, such as either the United Nations Model or the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development Model. See R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN
RELATED TRANSACTIONS 9-14 (1981). Even though the 1977 U.S. Model is a blueprint to be
followed rather than an actual treaty, the discussion that follows indicates that United
States tax treaties generally conform to the U.S. Model.
I The term "treaty country" here means the country with which the United States has a
tax treaty.
10 The term "third country resident" means those foreign individuals or alien corpora-
tions that have formed alien corporations in treaty countries, of which they are neither citi-
zens nor residents, in order to utilize the tax treaty benefits of the treaty country. See R.
RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 8, at 11-34.
" Id.
" 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 158 (June 16, 1981). For text of the June Draft's Article 16,
see infra note 99. The Chairman of Touche Ross International Tax Specialty Group noted
that ". . .in 1978, $3.9 billion of income was paid to residents of tax treaty coun-
tries. . .(representing) 87 % of the income earned by foreign persons on U.S. investments. If
one assumes a 10% return on investment, this means U.S. investments held by or through
treaty country residents totaled at least $39 billion in 1978. Steven P. Hannes, Third
Country Use: Is Time Running Out?, 28 TEMPO 23 (1983).
11 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 158 (June 16, 1981).
14 Id.
11 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 335 (May 7, 1981).
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December 1981, after the ratification of treaties with Jamaica 6 and
Argentina, 17 the Treasury announced another draft of Article 16
(the December draft).1
This paper traces the evolution of Article 16 through the three
stages of development during its twenty year history. Through the
first stage of the 1960's, the Treasury searched for justifications for
adopting Article 16. This paper considers those justifications and
examines whether they are valid today. The second stage in the
development of Article 16 occurred during the 1970's. This period
saw the informal adoption of Article 16, the formal announcement
of the 1977 U.S. Model, and the subsequent application of the
Model. Finally, the third stage of development of Article 16 is the
current transitional period which was initiated with the announce-
ment of the June draft. The current transitional period indicates
that the Treasury is reconsidering the tough anti-treaty shopping
position found in its June draft.
I. THE FIRST STAGE: IN SEARCH OF JUSTIFICATION
Treaty shopping in its simplest form involves two corpora-
tions: a domestic corporation 9 and a treaty corporation, which is
an alien corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country
that has a tax treaty with the United States. The treaty corpora-
tion is owned by a third country resident who is neither a resident
nor a citizen of the United States nor a citizen of the other treaty
country. If the treaty corporation is considered a resident20 of the
treaty country, an alien corporation will be entitled to the invest-
ment returns flowing from the domestic corporation to the alien
corporation. This configuration usually results in a greatly reduced
United States federal tax on dividends, interest, royalties, and cap-
ital gains for the alien corporation.2' The existence of an Article 16
"e See infra notes 75, 107.
"7 See infra note 113.
11 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 152A (December, 1981) [hereinafter cited as December 1981
Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model].
"9 "Domestic corporation" means a corporation "created or organized in the United
States or under the law of the United States or of any state." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(4) (1976).
"0 Under most treaties, a resident corporation is one organized under the treaty country
laws. See e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Extension to Netherlands An-
tilles, June 24 - Aug. 7, 1952, Nov. 4 - Nov. 10, 1955, United States-Netherlands, art. 11,
para. 1(d), 6 U.S.T. 3703, T.I.A.S. No. 3367, Additional Protocol, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S.
No. 5665 [hereinafter cited as Netherlands Antilles Convention].
" Some treaties have allowed reduced rates of taxation for capital gains; this, however,
has been curtailed to a great extent by the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act
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type provision, however, generally denies the treaty corporation
treaty benefits. Benefits are denied under the "preferred tax rate"
test where that corporation also enjoys a reduced tax rate in the
treaty country and under the "ownership" test where a substantial
number of its shareholders are not individual residents of the
treaty country.2 2 The United States signed four tax treaties during
the 1960's, each containing an Article 16 provision. A review of
each treaty establishes a framework for understanding the United
States policy regarding treaty shopping.
A. Article XV of the Luxembourg Tax Treaty
More than fifteen years before the Treasury announced the 1977
U.S. Model, the United States signed a tax treaty with Luxem-
bourg. 23 That treaty included an Article XV entitled "Holding
Companies." Article XV provided that the treaty benefits were
subject to compliance with the "preferred tax rate" test and the
"ownership" test. It stated that a Luxembourg corporation, taxed
at a special reduced rate by Luxembourg, would be unable to enjoy
lower United States tax treaty rates. 2' The treaty also provided,
however, that a special reduced Luxembourg tax rate for dividends
earned in the United States would not affect the lower United
States tax treaty rate where the Luxembourg corporation owned
twenty-five percent or more of the stock of the United States divi-
dend paying corporation.
Treaty supporters offered three justifications for the special pro-
vision in the Luxembourg Tax Treaty. The first justification was
based on the Treasury's concern that Luxembourg's tax laws per-
mitted third country residents to escape taxation altogether.26 Sec-
(FIRPTA). I.R.C. § 1247 (1976).
22 There are two variations in the language of Article 16 provisions which require that a
certain percentage of shareholders be individual residents from the treaty country. One vari-
ation limits third country ownership to no more than twenty-five percent. The other varia-
tion directs that seventy-five percent of the treaty corporation ownership be in the hands of
treaty country residents. See, e.g., Article 16 of the 1977 United States Model, as discussed
at note 8 and accompanying text, and para. 1, subpara. (a) of Article 16 in the June 1981
draft, as discussed at notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
23 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962, United
States-Luxembourg, 15 U.S.T. 2356, T.I.A.S. No. 5726.
24 Id. art. XV.
25 Id.
20 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) T 5348 (Dec. 18, 1962). At the hearings for this treaty, the Trea-
sury testified that Luxembourg exempted from all Luxembourg taxes those holding compa-
nies which only held investments and did not engage in business nor maintain an office open
to the public in Luxembourg. The Treasury argued that since these companies did not pay
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ond, supporters argued that the adoption of such a provision would
not affect the United States because, at the time, there were not a
large number of foreign-based investment holding companies in
the United States. Finally, supporters argued that the special pro-
vision would not affect the United States balance of payments.27
B. Article IXA of the Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty
A few months after signing the Luxembourg tax treaty, the
United States and the Netherlands agreed to extend their 1955 tax
treaty to the Netherlands Antilles. 8 The treaty included a new
provision, Article IXA, entitled "Investment or Holding Compa-
nies." '29 As in Luxembourg's Article XV, this provision contained a
"preferred tax rate" test and an "ownership" test. ° It provided
that treaty benefits would be denied to those Netherlands Antilles.
business entities which enjoyed a lower Netherlands Antilles tax
rate."' The treaty also provided, however, that most of the benefits
would not be denied where a Netherlands Antilles corporation
owned twenty-five percent or more of the stock of the United
States paying corporation. 32 Treaty benefits also would not be de-
nied where all of the stock of a Netherlands Antilles corporation
was owned by individual residents of the Netherlands or the
Netherlands Antilles, or by the Netherlands corporation.33
C. Article XI of the Canadian Tax Treaty
The original Canadian tax treaty provided that the United
States could tax United States sources of non-earned income of a
Canadian corporation with no permanent establishment in the
United States at a maximum rate of fifteen percent.34 In 1966,
any taxes to Luxembourg, it was not appropriate to grant them the same exemptions
granted to those companies that did pay taxes to Luxembourg. Id.
7 Id. A memorandum from the Joint Committee of Internal Revenue Taxation noted
that ". . .since the use of the Luxembourg holding companies to invest in the United States
has not been widespread. . .denial of the convention benefits to those companies should not
adversely affect the U.S. balance-of-payments position. 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH), supra
note 26.
28 Netherlands Antilles Convention, supra note 20.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3' Id. art. IXA(1).
22 Id. art. IXA(2)(a).
Id. art. IXA(2)(b).
24 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 12, 1950, United States-Can-
ada, 2 U.S.T. 2236, T.I.A.S. No. 2347.
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however, the treaty was amended to include a "preferred tax rate"
provision. The justifications for signing the amendment to the
Canadian tax treaty were the same as those presented for signing
Article XV of the Luxembourg tax treaty. Proponents argued that
the interaction of the Canadian tax laws and the treaty would per-
mit third country residents to escape taxation altogether36 and that
the amendment to the treaty would not affect the United States
balance of payments.3
D. Article 16 of the Brazilian Tax Treaty
In 1967, the United States signed and ratified a tax treaty with
Brazil that never went into effect.38 The treaty included an Article
16 provision entitled "Investment or Holding Companies," which
contained the "preferred tax rate" and "ownership" require-
ments.39 The section provided that treaty benefits would be denied
if the other participating treaty country granted reduced tax rates
and if twenty-five percent or more of the stock of the corporation
in question was owned by persons who were not individual resi-
dents of the treaty country.40 Although this treaty was signed ten
years prior to 1977, it was the version adopted in the 1977 U.S.
Model, and it became the standard anti-treaty shopping provision
until 1981.
35 Id. art. XI(6). The amendment excluded those Canadian corporations that also were
exempt from taxation in Canada. Id.
" Tax Conventions with Brazil, Canada, and Trinidad and Tobago: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Tax Con-
vention). Professor Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, told the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations that "[tlhe proposed convention...would modify the ex-
isting. . .treaty by denying the reduced rate of U.S. withholding tax. . .to cer-
tain... corporations which are nothing more than conduits for investment in the United
States by persons who are not residents of. . .and who would not otherwise be entitled to
the benefits of the tax treaty. They are persons whom the tax treaty. . .was not intended to
benefit. . . .The effect of this amendment is to eliminate unintended preferential treatment
accorded to persons living outside both countries. . .resulting from the interaction of
. . .[the treaty]. . .and domestic law of Canada .. " Id.
3 Id. Surrey also testified that "there are unlikely to be any adverse conse-
quences. . .. We have explored the questions whether the change might adversely affect the
volume of foreign investment in the United States and have concluded that it would not.
Alternative portfolio investment opportunities for (non-treaty) residents are limited.
Id.
38 1 TAx TR ATIES (CCH) V 819 (March 13, 1967).
39 Id.
40 Id.
" Article 16 of the Brazilian tax treaty reads as follows:
INVESTMENT OR HOLDING COMPANIES
A corporation of one of the Contracting States deriving dividends, interest or roy-
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E. Summary and Criticism
A review of these four treaties indicates that the United States
primarily concerned itself during the 1960's with the internal tax
policies of the treaty countries. The United States believed such
attention was necessary to correct an undesirable "loophole" in the
internal tax laws of those treaty countries. Arguably, though, the
United States should not feel the need to rewrite the tax law of a
foreign country which desires to attract foreign investment through
tax benefits. Thus, the inclusion of these anti-treaty shopping pro-
visions in the tax treaties was no more than a civilized version of
gun-boat diplomacy.
The justifications for the adoption of such provisions merit ob-
servation. The United States believed that it was "not appropri-
ate" to grant the same tax treaty benefits to all treaty corporations
of a country when some of those treaty corporations were also ex-
empt from the tax laws of the participating treaty country.42 In
fact, that belief was so strong that on at least one occasion the
United States urged a foreign country to change its tax laws in
alties from sources within the other Contracting State shall not be entitled to the
benefits of Article 12, Article 13, or Article 14 if (a) by reason of special measures
granting tax benefits to investment or holding companies the tax imposed on such
corporation by the former Contracting State with respect to such dividends, inter-
est or royalties is substantially less than the tax generally imposed by such Con-
tracting State on corporate profits, and (b) 25 percent or more of the capital of
such corporation is held of record or is otherwise determined, after consultation
between the competent authorities of the Contracting States, to be owned, di-
rectly or indirectly, by one or more persons who are not individual residents of the
former Contracting State (or, if residents of Brazil, are citizens of the United
States).
Id. See also 1977 U.S. Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 8. The
Treasury proffered a new justification at the Brazilian treaty hearing for including an anti-
treaty shopping provision, arguing that limiting treaty benefits to third country residents
helped eliminate double taxation. 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 852 (Mar. 13, 1967). The Trea-
sury also contended that
"the purpose of this provision is to prevent residents of third countries from using
a corporation in one treaty country, which is preferentially taxed in that country,
to obtain the tax benefits in the other treaty country. . . .This accords with the
purpose of an income tax convention between two countries which is to lessen or
eliminate the amount of double taxation of income derived from within one coun-
try by a resident of the other country ... " Id. At the time this treaty was signed,
however, Brazil did not have any law granting reduced rates to any companies. Id.
Thus, the Treasury also stated that "at the present time, neither Brazil nor the
United States grants to investment or holding companies the type of tax bene-
fits. . .which would make this provision. . .applicable.
Id.
4" See supra note 26.
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order to correct the problem. In that case, when Canada did
change its laws, the United States felt that the revision did not go
far enough; thus, further amendment of the treaty was required.43
In the Canadian example, the appropriate legislative body of a for-
eign government adopted specific tax laws for the benefit of that
foreign country, yet the executive branch of the United States gov-
ernment and the appropriate branch of the foreign country circum-
vented those laws through treaty negotiations.
Another argument in support of the adoption of Article 16 provi-
sions has been that there were not a substantial number of foreign
investment holding companies in the United States at the time
such provisions were first adopted.4 Proponents also argued that
such provisions would not affect the United States balance of pay-
ments."5 If, in fact, such a scenario were present, the limitations of
an Article 16 provision should not have been imposed before a tax
treaty was signed with any foreign country.'6 Given the dramatic
increase in both the number and dollar of United States invest-
ments held by treaty country corporations in recent years, 7 the
adoption of anti-treaty-shopping policies may adversely affect both
the United States balance of payments and the overall interna-
4S See supra note 36. At the Senate hearings on the Canadian treaty amendment, Profes-
sor Surrey testified that "the existence of this loophole was called to the attention of the
Canadian Government. . . and legislation was enacted in Canada. . . however, the legisla-
tion applied only to newly created Canadian corporations. . .preexisting Canadian corpora-
tions continued to retain their tax exempt status. . . . At about the same time. . . the in-
come tax treaty. . . [with the Netherlands Antilles]. . . was modified to eliminate a similar
loophole for foreign investors arising out of the interaction of that tax treaty and the Antil-
les tax laws. This. . . placed a premium on Canadian tax-exempt corporations. . . (and)
trafficking developed in dormant Canadian corporations created prior to the change in Ca-
nadian law .. " Tax Conventions, supra note 36 (statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury). When Canada did change its laws, the United States felt
that the change did not go far enough and, eventually, the treaty was amended to reflect the
desired situation. Given that the law making body of a country is the appropriate body in
which to legislate tax laws that the country deems necessary for its national interest, the
executive branch should not be permitted to blatantly circumvent those tax laws. It was not
until 1981 that the United States abandoned its concern for "loopholes" in the tax laws of
other countries. See text accompanying note 116.
'4 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27 and 37 and accompanying text.
" 2 TAX TREATIES (P-H) 110,011 (1983).
17 See supra note 12. Netherlands Antilles Minister Harold Henriquez indicated that
"over 200 leading U.S. corporations have established international finance subsidiaries in
the Netherlands Antilles to issue Eurobonds to foreign investors because the protocol to the
Tax Treaty exempts interest paid to those foreigners from withholding tax. TAX
TREATIES, supra note 46.
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tional financial sector."8 Such policies, therefore, may no longer be
justifiable.
The last argument presented during the 1960's for the adoption
of Article 16 provisions was that limiting treaty benefits to third
country residents helped eliminate the threat of double taxation."9
Arguably, however, the prevention of benefits to third country resi-
dents is irrelevant to the issue of avoiding double taxation. While a
tax treaty may eliminate double taxation of corporations doing
business in more than one country, the denial of a tax treaty bene-
fit does not always decrease double taxation. On the contrary, the
denial of a tax treaty benefit probably will increase the corpora-
tion's tax burden in the country where the tax benefit is denied.
Professor Stanley S. Surrey, then Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, said in 1967 that taxes present a barrier to the interna-
tional mobility of labor and capital and that such a barrier can be
overcome through the implementation of tax treaties."0 Fourteen
years later, the same opinion was voiced by Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury, John E. Chapoton.5 1 While tax treaties help the in-
ternational exchange of labor and capital, adoption of a tightly
written Article 16 provision may not promote such a policy. As
Minister Henriquez indicated, the utilization of the Netherlands
Antilles tax treaty has not only contributed to the movement of
international capital, but it also has helped to deter the devalua-
tion of the dollar, to channel capital into the United States, to pro-
48 TAX TREATIES, supra note 46. In response to criticism directed at the Netherlands An-
tilles for its role in treaty-shopping, Minister Henriquez noted that "in the mid nineteen
sixties. . . borrowing was encouraged [and required] by the various U.S. balance of payment
programs. . . [and in] the nineteen seventies. . . the U.S. continued to encourage its compa-
nies to use the Netherlands Antilles finance route to issue Eurobonds on the Eurodollar
market .. " Id.
49 See supra note 41.
"o Tax Conventions, supra note 36 (statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury). Assistant Secretary Surrey testified that "the need for solutions to these
types of international tax problems is unquestionable. Taxes can be an effective barrier re-
stricting the international mobility of capital, labor, and skills, a mobility which economi-
cally is highly desirable. We have to proceed to achieve such solutions by means of bilateral
agreements which conform as closely as possible to the standards considered to represent
the most rational international treatment of each type of income-generating transac-
tion ... " Id.
" Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1981) (statement of John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (herein-
after cited as Foreign Relations Hearing). Assistant Secretary Chapoton said that "we view
tax treaties as an important element in the overall international economic policy of the
United States. One of the fundamental objectives of this policy is to minimize impediments
to the free international flow of capital and technology .. " Id.
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mote the United States housing and construction industries, to
lower the cost of borrowing in the United States, and to maintain
the value of United States stocks.2
In conclusion, the Treasury during the 1960's presented many
justifications for Article 16 provisions that, in retrospect, are at
least suspect. As will be seen from the material that follows, the
Treasury during the 1960's decided that the official justification
behind the adoption of an Article 16 type provision simply would
be preventing unintended benefits.
II. THE SECOND STAGE: FROM AN UNPUBLISHED STANDARD To
AN OFFICIAL MODEL
While the 1960's was a period of policy formulation, the 1970's
saw the development of an informal standard provision and the
adoption of the official Article 16 of the 1977 U.S. Model.
A. The Treaties
The United States signed a total of nine tax treaties during the
1970's. First it signed a treaty with Finland in 1970. The Finland
treaty contained an Article 27 which was essentially the same as
Article 16 of the Brazilian tax treaty discussed above.53 The
Treasury again indicated that the rationale behind the adoption of
such an article was the prevention of unintended benefits to third
country residents. 4
The Treasury also signed a tax treaty with Trinidad and Tobago
in 1970.55 While the language of its Article 16 was similar to the
-Brazilian language, the Trinidad and Tobago treaty was more leni-
ent in that the treaty corporation's twenty-five percent ownership
requirement was defined as any type of "residents" rather than as
, See supra note 47.
" Convention on Taxes on Income and Property, Mar. 6, 1970, United States-Finland,
art. 27, 22 U.S.T. 40, 72, T.I.A.S. No. 7042. See also text accompanying notes 38-41.
64 See supra note 39. The rationale for such a provision was stated by the Treasury when
it stated that ". . . the purpose of this Article is to deal with a potential abuse which could
occur if one of the States provided preferential rates of tax for investment or holding com-
panies. In such a case, residents of third countries could organize a corporation in the State
extending the preferential rates for the purpose of making investments in the other State.
The combination of the low tax rates in the first State and the reduced rates or exemptions
in the other State would enable the third-country residents to realize unintended bene-
fits .. " Tax Conventions with Belgium, Finland, Trinidad and Tobago and the Nether-
lands: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1970).
5 Convention on Taxes on Income, Jan. 9, 1970, United States-Trinidad-Tobago, art. 16,
22 U.S.T. 164, 180, T.I.A.S. No. 7047.
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"individual residents" of the treaty country. 6
The Treasury signed a second tax treaty with Norway in 1971
that contained an Article 16 provision.17 This treaty differed from
the one it replaced in two respects. First, for the first time in any
tax treaty, favored treatment for capital gains was one of the bene-
fits denied. Second, twenty-five percent of the capital of the treaty
corporation had to be owned by "individual residents" rather than
mere "residents."58
The United States in 1975 signed tax treaties with the United
Kingdom, 59 Iceland,60 and Israel."' The versions of Article 16 found
in these treaties were essentially the same as the Article 16 provi-
sion in the 1971 treaty with Norway.2 The Treasury's rationale for
the version of Article 16 in the Iceland and Israel treaties was the
rationale proffered during the 1970 hearing on the Finland treaty. 3
In 1976, the United States signed tax treaties with South Ko-
rea 64 and the Phillippines.15 The Korean treaty's version of Article
16 was identical to those of the treaties with Israel, Iceland, and
Norway,86 using the standard language and including capital gains
in the list of possible tainted benefits. 7 As with the Brazilian tax
treaty of 1967, when the Korean treaty was signed Korea had no
5I Id.
Convention For the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Nor-
way, art. 20, 23 U.S.T. 2834, 2850, T.I.A.S. No. 7474.
I8 d.
'9 Convention on Double Taxation-Taxes on Income, Apr. 16, 1945, United States-United
Kingdom, art. 16, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546; Supplementary Protocol, 6 U.S.T. 37,
T.I.A.S. No. 3165, Extension to Certain British Territories, 9 U.S.T. 1459, T.I.A.S. No. 4141,
Supplementary Protocol, 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. 6089; Convention on Double Taxation-
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, United States-United Kingdom, 31
U.S.T. 5668, T.I.A.S. No. 9682.
"0 Convention on Double Taxation-Taxes on Income and Capital, May 7, 1975, United
States-Iceland, art. 27, 26 U.S.T. 2004, 2100, T.I.A.S. No. 8151.
" Agreement on Economic Cooperation, May 13, 1975, United States-Israel, 26 U.S.T.
1674, T.I.A.S. No. 8127, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 44,228 (Nov. 20, 1975).
"2 See supra note 57. The only significant difference betweeen the 1975 treaties and the
1971 Norwegian treaty was that the treaty with the United Kingdom did not include capital
gains in its list of tainted income, as the Norwegian, Icelandic, and Israeli treaties did. See
supra notes 57, 59-61.
63 See supra notes 53, 54; 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 3739 (1975); Tax Treaties: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 305-6 (1981) (techni-
cal explanation of the convention between the United States and Israel).
64 Convention on Double Taxation-Taxes on Income, June 4, 1976, United States-Korea,
art. 17, 30 U.S.T. 5253, 5288, T.I.A.S. No. 9506.
"8 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 6635 (Oct. 1, 1976).
66 See supra note 57.
6 See supra note 62.
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law providing for special benefits to some corporations. That pro-
hibition was added, however, since a special rate might arise in the
future."'
The tax treaty signed with the Phillipines in 1976 was unusual in
that it did not contain an Article 16 provision. 9 The Senate did
not ratify this treaty until five years later and specifically re-
quested that the Treasury negotiate an anti-treaty shopping provi-
sion with the Phillipines.7 °
In 1977, the Treasury signed a tax treaty with Morocco. 71 Article
24 of the Moroccan treaty contained the same Article 16 provisions
found in the treaties with Korea, Israel, Iceland, and Norway.72 As
far as enforcement was concerned, however, Morocco appeared to
believe that collection of taxes from third country residents using
Moroccan addresses was solely a concern of the United States. 73
Also in 1977, the U.S. Model was introduced.74 Even though it
emerged ten years and ten tax treaties after the Brazilian treaty
was signed, Article 16 of the 1977 U.S. Model was the same as Ar-
ticle 16 of the Brazilian treaty.75 As in the Brazilian treaty, the
1977 U.S. Model contained both the "preferred tax rate" and
68 See supra note 64.
09 See supra note 65.
70 Id.
71 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 5127 (Aug. 1, 1977).
72 Id.
78 Letter from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to President James Carter (Apr. 25, 1978),
reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 5633 (Aug. 1, 1977). Given Morocco's attitude, the
Treasury should not expect much cooperation from Morocco in preventing treaty shopping.
Id. Morocco, like other nations who were party to similar anti-treaty shopping provisions,
did not grant tax benefits to investment or holding companies at the time of the treaty
signing. Id. at $ 5627.
74 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 153 (May 7, 1977).
75 Compare id. with supra note 41. The 1977 version of Article 16 of the United States
Model Treaty stated as follows:
Article 16
Investment or Holding Companies
If 25 percent or more of the capital of a company which is a resident of a Con-
tracting State is owned directly or indirectly by individuals who are not residents
of that State, and if by reason of special measures the tax imposed by that State
on that company with respect to dividends, interest or royalties arising in the
other Contracting State is substantially less than the tax generally imposed by the
first-mentioned State on corporate business profits, then, nothwithstanding the
provisions of Article 10 (Dividends), 11 (Interest), or 12 (Royalties), that other
State may tax such dividends, interest or royalties. For the purposes of this Arti-
cle, the source of dividends, interest or royalties shall be determined in accordance
with paragraph (3)(a), (b), or (c) of Article 23 (Relief from Double Taxation).
TAx TREATIES (CCH), supra note 74.
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"ownership" requirements.7"
The wording of Article 16 in the 1977 U.S. Model should not
have been a surprise to tax treaty followers because previous trea-
ties contained the same approach. The surprise should have been
that the 1977 U.S. Model's Article 16 did not include capital gains
as one of the treaty benefits that could be denied to foreign tax-
payers.77 In addition, while previous treaty provisions used the
word "shall" when referring to the times in which treaty benefits
were to be denied, the 1977 U.S. Model changed the language to a
more lenient "may.
78
After the announcement of the 1977 U.S. Model, the United
States failed to sign any tax treaties until 1980 when it signed tax
treaties with Malta,79 Cyprus,80 Jamaica,"' Denmark, 82 Egypt,
8 3
and Bangladesh.8 4 All six tax treaties generally followed the 1977
U.S. Model's version of Article 16; some of the treaties, however,
merit specific attention.
The tax treaty with Cyprus 5 contains a provision not previously
encountered. Article 26 of the Cyprus treaty contains a legal pre-
sumption regarding the required number of resident shareholders.
The treaty provides that where the stock of the treaty corporation
is traded in a recognized stock exchange, it will be presumed that
the required number of shareholders own the stock of the treaty
78 TAX TREATIES (CCH), supra note 74.
77 Id.; see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 75.
"' Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Malta with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 31, 1980, United States-Malta, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
-, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 5403 (Mar. 31, 1980).
So Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 26, 1980, United States-Cyprus, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) V 2003 (Mar. 26, 1980).
This treaty was superseded by the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 19,
1984, United States-Cyprus, - U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES
(CCH) (P 200)3 (Mar. 19, 1984).
8' Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 21, 1980, United States-Jamaica,
- U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) V 4386 (May 21, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 Jamaica Convention]; Protocol Amending Convention with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income Signed at Kingston on May 21, 1980, July 17, 1981, United States-
Jamaica, - U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. __, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) I 4387D (July
17, 1981) (hereinafter cited as 1981 Jamaica Protocol).
12 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, June 17, 1980, United States-Denmark,
- U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 2053 (June 17, 1980).
" Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Aug. 24, 1980, United States-Egypt, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. __, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8003 (Aug. 24, 1980).
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 6, 1980, United States-Bangladesh,
SU.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 573 (Oct. 6, 1980).
a' See supra note 80.
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corporation."'
The original treaty between the United States and Denmark did
not contain an Article 16 provision.8 7 The United States and Den-
mark's 1980 renegotiation resulted in an Article 17 entitled "In-
vestment and Holding Companies, '"88 which was almost identical to
Article 16 of the U.S. Model. The first Article 17, however, eventu-
ally was deleted and replaced with a new Article 17 by a Protocol
signed on August 23, 1983.89
The Senate hearings on the Egyptian tax treaty90 reveal that in
the 1980's the Treasury was using, almost verbatim, the same argu-
ments it used in the hearings held for both the 1967 treaty with
Brazil and the 1970 treaty with Finland. The Treasury again con-
tended that prevention of benefits to third country residents "ac-
cords with the purpose" of the elimination of double taxation" and
the prevention of unintended benefits to third country residents
who utilize a treaty country's tax laws along with the treaty in or-
der to minimize their tax burden."e
86 Id.
87 Convention between the United States and Denmark, May 6, 1948, 62 Stat. 1730,
T.I.A.S. No. 1854.
" See supra note 82.
89 Protocol Amending Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income signed at Washington
on June 17, 1980, art. 17, Aug. 23, 1983, United States-Denmark, - U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No.
-1 reprinted in 1 TAx TR ATIES (CCH) T 2083 (Aug. 23, 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
Denmark Protocol]. See infra notes 179-90.
90 Foreign Relations Hearing (statement of John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury), supra note 51.
9' Id. "U.S. tax treaties also include anti-abuse provisions designed to prevent residents of
third countries from channeling investments into the United States through the treaty
country, thereby, deriving treaty benefits to which they are not justifiably entitled." Id. This
argument essentially mirrored the one presented in 1967 during the Canadian Tax Treaty
Hearings. See supra note 36.
92 Foreign Relations Hearing (technical explanation of the convention between the
United States and Egypt), supra note 51. The statements made at the Senate hearings in
support of this provision were noteworthy because they no longer mentioned that foreign
holding companies are not in widespread use in the United States, nor that such provisions
will have a minimum effect on the United States balance of payments. Id. Instead the ra-
tionale now presented by the Treasury is one of preventing "unintended benefits." Id. Trea-
sury officials testified that:
the purpose of this Article is to deal with potential abuse which could occur if one
of the Contracting States provided preferential rates of tax for investment or
holding companies. In the absence of this Article, residents of third countries
could organize a corporation in the Contracting State extending the preferential
rates for the purpose of making investments in the other Contracting State. The
combination of low tax rates in the first-mentioned Contracting State would en-
able the third country residents to realize unintended benefits ....
Id. This statement was the same statement made in 1970 at the Finland treaty hearings, see
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The 1980 Bangladesh treaty9" was significant in that the Senate
ratification hearings on this treaty took place after the Treasury
announced the June 1981 draft which proposed a revision to Arti-
cle 16 of the 1977 U.S. Model. "' The treaty is also notable because
the Senate specifically stated its intention that the term "capital"
receive a broad construction so that it might include preferred
stock and convertible debt in addition to common stock.9 5
The Senate comments on the Bangladesh treaty also contained
the first statements about the June draft. The June draft con-
tained the most encompassing provision ever included in any Arti-
cle 16. The June draft provided that the income realized by the
treaty corporation may not substantially be used to pay debts and
royalties to third country residents.9 6 Although after the June draft
the Senate indicated in the Bangladesh hearings that the term
"capital" was to include preferred stock and convertible debt, no
reference to straight "debt" was made in the June draft. This
omission served as an indication that third country creditors might
continue to lend funds to treaty corporations without fear that
treaty benefits would be denied to the treaty corporation. 7
III. THE THIRD STAGE: A NEW PERIOD OF TRANSITION FOR
ARTICLE 16
The June 1981 Treasury announcement which revealed the pro-
posed draft with changes to Article 16 of the 1977 U.S. Model initi-
ated a period of transition in the development of Article 16.98 The
announcement was followed by the ratification of three tax trea-
ties, a subsequent new December draft of Article 16, the ratifica-
supra notes 53 & 54, at the Iceland treaty hearings, 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 3739 (1975),
and at the Israeli treaty hearings, see supra note 63.
93 See supra note 84.
" See supra note 13. The June draft was first announced on June 16, 1981, id., while the
Bangladesh treaty hearings took place on September 24, 1981. See supra note 84; see infra
note 99.
9' 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 575 (1981). As the Bangladesh treaty followed the 1977 U.S.
Model, it also contained the term "capital" in Article 16. See supra note 75.
" See supra note 14.
97 Id.
98 Prior to the announcement of the June draft, the Treasury signed a treaty with the
British Virgin Islands. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Feb. 2, 1981, United
States-British Virgin Islands, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 1016 (Feb. 2, 1981). Article 13 of this treaty contained the "preferred tax rate" and
"ownership" requirements of Article 16 of the 1977 U.S. Model. Id. The Senate has yet to
act on this treaty, which is understandable, given the changes found in the June draft of
1981.
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tion of two additional tax treaties, and the signing of two protocols.
A. The June 1981 Draft
The draft of Article 16 proposed in June 1981 contained sub-
stantial changes to Article 16 of the 1977 U.S. Model Treaty.99 The
most important provisions that emerged from the June 1981 draft
were the following four requirements: the "preferred tax rate" re-
quirement; the "ownership" or "stock exchange" requirement; the
"business purpose" requirement; and the "prohibited payment"
requirement.
The "preferred tax rate" requirement was unchanged from the
provision that had appeared in the 1977 U.S. Model and in almost
every treaty previously discussed. The "preferred tax rate" provi-
sion required that the treaty corporation could not enjoy a pre-
go See supra note 12. The June draft of Article 16 read as follows:
Article 16 Limitation of Benefits
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a Contracting State
shall be entitled under this Convention to relief from taxation in the other Con-
tracting State unless:
(a) more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest in such person is owned, di-
rectly or indirectly, by one or more individual residents of the first-mentioned
Contracting State; and
(b) the income of such person is not used in substantial part, directly or indirectly,
to meet liabilities (including liabilities for interest or royalties) to persons who are
residents of a State other than a Contracting State and who are not citizens of the
United States.
For the purpose of subparagraph (a), a company that has a substantial trading
in its stock on a recognized exchange in a Contracting State is presumed to be
owned by individual residents of that Contracting State.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if it is determined that the acquisition or mainte-
nance of such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as a principal
purpose obtaining benefits under the Convention.
3. Any relief from tax provided by a Contracting State to a resident of the other
Contracting State under the Convention shall be inapplicable to the extent that,
under the law in force in that other State, the income to which the relief relates
bears significantly lower tax than similar income arising within that other state
derived by residents of that other State.
Id.
The June draft included several revisions of the 1977 U.S. Model. The June draft entitled
its Article 16 provision "Limitation of Benefits", as opposed to the 1977 U.S. Model's "In-
vestment or Holding Companies". Compare supra note 14 with supra note 80. The June
draft applied to all benefits received under a treaty, while the 1977 U.S. Model applied only
to dividends, interest, and royalties. Compare supra note 75 with supra note 80. The June
draft applied to all taxpayers except individuals, whereas the 1977 U.S. Model referred to
corporations or companies. The June draft used the language "shall not be entitled" instead
of the 1977 U.S. Model's less restrictive language of "may be entitled". See supra notes 75,
80.
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ferred tax rate under a treaty country's tax laws. 1' While this pro-
vision has appeared in almost all previous treaties, the June draft
marked the last time that the United States showed any concern
for "loopholes" in the treaty country tax laws.
The "ownership" or "stock exchange" requirement of the June
draft required that more than seventy-five percent of the "benefi-
cial interest" of the treaty corporation be owned by individuals
who are residents in the treaty country. 10 1 This requirement was
similar to the language of the 1977 U.S. Model which stated that
treaty benefits would be denied if twenty-five percent or more of
the capital of the treaty corporation was owned other than by indi-
vidual residents of the treaty country.0 2 The Treasury here used
the phrase "beneficial interest" instead of "capital." If the Senate
was prepared to use a very broad definition for the word "capital"
in the Bangladesh treaty, as was discussed above,10 3 then it should
be expected that the phrase "beneficial interest" will have an even
broader meaning if a treaty using that phrase is ratified by the
Senate.
Unlike the 1977 U.S. Model, the June draft provides for a "stock
exchange" test as an alternative to the "ownership" test. 4 This
new provision is really more of a presumption than a requirement;
if the stock of the treaty corporation is substantially traded in the
treaty country's stock exchange, then the treaty corporation will
be presumptively owned by individual residents of the treaty
country. 06
The "business purpose" test in the June draft requires that the
treaty corporation be able to establish that the principal purpose
of its existence is one other than utilization of treaty benefits. 0
There are no similar provisions in the 1977 U.S. Model.107
By the "prohibited payments" requirement, the June draft re-
quires that the income of the treaty corporation not be used for
certain prohibited purposes.' 0 8 The draft prohibits the income real-
100 See June draft, supra note 99, at § 3.
'' See June draft, supra note 99, at § 1(a).
101 See supra note 75.
101 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
104 See June draft, supra note 99, at § l(b).
105 Id. This provision was first seen in the 1980 Cyprus treaty. See supra notes 85 & 86
and accompanying text.
104 See June draft, supra note 99, at § 2.
107 See supra note 75. There are Revenue Rulings which contain the business purpose
requirement. Rev. Rul. 75-23, 1975-1 C.B. 290 and Rev. Rul. 79-65, 1979-1 C.B. 458.
"' See June draft, supra note 99, at § l(b).
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ized by the treaty corporation from being used substantially to pay
interest or royalties to third country residents.1 °9 There was no
such requirement in the 1977 U.S. Model."' Thus, under the 1977
U.S. Model, a third country resident could lend substantial funds
to a treaty corporation and thereby receive substantial amounts of
interest without jeopardizing the treaty benefits;"' that, however,
is no longer possible under the June draft of 1981." 2
B. The Three Treaties Following the June Draft
1. 1981 Protocol with Jamaica
The original Article 17 of the 1980 treaty with Jamaica" 3 was
deleted and replaced with a new Article 17 by a Protocol signed
July 17, 1981.1 4 Like the June draft of Article 16, Jamaica's Arti-
cle 17 entitled "Limitation of Benefits" is applicable to all treaty
benefits, and to all persons other than individuals, and uses the
phrase "shall not be entitled"," 5 which indicates that the taxpayer
is not entitled to relief from double taxation.
While Jamaica's Article 17 contains the "ownership" or "stock
exchange" test, the "business purpose" test, and the "prohibited
payment" test, it does not contain the "preferred tax rate" test."'
This protocol is the first indication of the Treasury's willingness to
drop its concern for "loopholes" in the tax laws of the treaty coun-
try. In effect, by moving from a four-requirement to a three-re-
quirement type of Article 16, the Treasury backed away from the
tough anti-treaty shopping provision of the June draft.
The Jamaican protocol also provides for an alternative provision
to meet the "business purpose" requirement which in effect per-
mits third country resident ownership of a treaty corporation. 1 7
Article 17 of the Jamaican protocol states that the "business pur-
pose" requirement may be satisfied as long as the "prohibited pay-
ment" test is satisfied and one of two additional requirements are
met. The two additional requirements are that any United States
109 Id.
110 See supra note 75.
"l Id.
112 See June draft, supra note 99.
11 See 1980 Jamaica Convention, supra note 81.
"' See 1981 Jamaica Protocol, supra note 81 at art. 3.
11 Id.
Id.
Id., art. 17, § 3.
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source income in question must be incidental to the business oper-
ations in Jamaica, or that third country residents owning the
Jamaican company must be residents of a country which has a
treaty with the United States providing the same benefits provided
by the Jamaican treaty.118
2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the Phil-
lipines Tax Treaty
A tax treaty with the Phillipines was signed on October 1,
1976.11 e That treaty, however, did not contain an anti-treaty shop-
ping provision. A Senate Committee Report indicates that, while it
was fully cognizant of the lack of such an article and the problems
associated with not having such an article, the Committee still rec-
ommended ratification without reservation because ratification of
the treaty was overdue and any reservation might cause further
delay.120 The Committee, however, also requested that the Trea-
sury negotiate an Article 16 type provision in accordance with the
current United States Model.' 2' The Committee's choice of the
word "current" should be emphasized because the committee ap-
peared to be referring to the 1977 Model, rather than the June
draft.
3. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the Argen-
tina Tax Treaty
On December 15, 1981, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approved, with reservation, the Argentina Tax Treaty signed on
May 7, 1981.122 The Committee included a reservation asserting
that the treaty should include an article or provision limiting
treaty benefits to third country residents.2 3 The Treasury did not
ask for such an article even when it learned that Argentina had no
objection. The Senate Committee Report stated that the Argentina
11 Id.
"' See supra note 69.
120 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 6635 (1980).
1 Id. The Committee Report requested that "the Treasury Department negotiate an
anti-abuse provision that follows the principles of the provision in the current United States
Model .. " Id.
122 S. REP. No. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981); Convention with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital, May 7, 1981, United States-Argentina, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -,
reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 303 (May 7, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Argentina
Treaty].
123 S. REP. No. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981).
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treaty did not offer significant opportunities to motivate "treaty
shopping."124 In the past, however, that fact had not prevented the
Treasury from insisting on such articles. As the committee ac-
knowledged, such treaty shopping opportunities might develop
later, and in fact it becomes difficult to renegotiate a new provision
when abuses develop.1 25
Both the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
and the ranking minority member of that committee expressed
particular concern over the absence of anti-treaty shopping provi-
sions in the treaty.126 The Report also contained the Senate's ver-
sion of an anti-treaty shopping article. The Committee Report rec-
ommended approval of the treaty as long as the following article
was included:
A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a con-
tracting state and which derives income from sources within the
other contracting state shall not be entitled to the benefits under
this convention accorded by that other contracting state if 25 per-
cent or more of the beneficial interest in such person is owned,
directly or indirectly, by individuals who are not residents of the
first mentioned contracting state. For purposes of this paragraph,
a corporation that has substantial trading in its stock on a recog-
nized exchange in a contracting state is presumed to be owned by
residents of that contracting state. This paragraph shall not apply
if it is determined that the acquisition or maintenance of such
person and the conduct of its operations did not have as a princi-
pal purpose obtaining benefits under the convention.
124 Id.
126 Id. at 6.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 6-7. This provision applied to all treaty benefits, as did the June draft and the
Jamaica treaty. Compare the Senate's phrase "a company... (that does the prohibited
act). . . shall not be entitled to the benefits under this convention...", id. with the 1977
Model language of "a person (that does the prohibited act)... may tax such dividends,
interest or royalties .. ", supra note 8, and with the June draft phrase ". . . a person...
shall not be entitled under this Convention to relief from taxation. . .(if the prohibited act
takes place) .. ", supra note 99. As did the June draft and the Jamaica treaty, the Argen-
tina provision also applies to all persons other than individuals. Compare S. REP. No. 49,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981) with supra notes 99 and 75. The Argentina provision uses the
phrases "shall not be entitled." Compare S. REP. No. 49, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (1981) with
supra notes 99 and 75, and "beneficial interests." Compare the language in the Senate's
version which prohibits ". . .25 percent or more of the beneficial interest .. ", S. REP. No.
49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981) with the 1977 Model language which prohibits that "25
percent or more of the capital of a company...", supra note 75 and the June 1981 language
which requires that "more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest. , supra note 99, of
the entity in question be owned by parties defined in the provision.
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The tests which the Senate included in its provision were signifi-
cant. The provision contained the "ownership"1 28 or "stock ex-
change" test 129 and the "business purpose" test. ° Unlike the 1977
U.S. Model and the June draft, but like the Jamaica treaty, the
Argentina provision did not contain the "preferred tax rate" re-
quirement.1 31 Furthermore, the most important requirement ab-
sent in the Argentina treaty was the "prohibited payment" re-
quirement.1 32 The Senate's Argentina provision constituted the
first time this requirement had been absent since its appearance in
the June draft. The Senate did make reference to convertible debt
in the Bangladesh ratification hearings; yet, it did not include
straight debt in its commentaries about the word "capital". 133 The
absence of the "prohibited payment" test or of the "preferred tax
rate" test in the Argentina provision represented a defeat to the
Treasury. In its short history, the Treasury's tough anti-treaty
shopping provision moved from the four-requirement provision
first announced in the June draft to the three-requirement provi-
sion of the Jamaica treaty and then to the two-requirement provi-
sion of the Argentina treaty.
C. The December 1981 Revised Draft of Article 16 of the 1977
United States Model
On December 23, 1981 the Treasury announced a revised version
of the proposed draft which had been announced the previous
June.134 The December draft applies only to items of income,
128 See infra note 129.
129 Id.; see also supra notes 99 and 127 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 99, 122, and 127 and accompanying text.
131 Compare supra note 127 with supra notes 81, 75, and 99.
"3I See supra note 127.
"33 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
"3' See December 1981 Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model, supra note 18. The December 1981
draft provides as follows:
Article 16 Investment or Holding Companies
1. A corporation which is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled
under this Convention to relief from taxation in the other Contracting State with
respect to an item of income, gains or profits unless the corporation establishes
that:
(a) its stock of any class is listed on an approved stock exchange in a Contracting
State, or that it is wholly owned, directly or through one or more corporations
each of which is a resident of a Contracting State, by a corporation the stock of
which any class is so listed; or
(b) it is not controlled by a person or persons who are not residents of a Con-
tracting State, other than citizens of the United States; or
(c) it was not a principal purpose of the corporation or of the conduct of its busi-
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gains, or profits, while the June draft and its subsequent treaties
refer to all benefits under the treaty.13 5 The December draft ap-
plies only to corporations, whereas the June draft and the treaties
subsequent to the June draft apply to all taxpayers except
individuals. 13s
The most significant difference between the December draft and
all other treaties is the number of requirements of the December
draft. Instead of the June draft's four-requirement test, or Ja-
maica's three-requirement test, or Argentina's two-requirement
test, the December draft contains only one requirement. The De-
cember draft states that a treaty corporation may satisfy Article 16
by meeting only one of three possible tests: the "stock exchange"
test, 3 7 the "business purpose" test,' or the "control" test.13 9 The
ness or of the acquisition or maintenance by it of the shareholding or other prop-
erty from which the income in question is derived to obtain any of such benefits.
2. For the purpose of this Article:
(a) an approved stock exchange in-- means -;
(b) an approved stock exchange in the United States means the NASDAQ System
owned by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and any stock ex-
change registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a national se-
curities exchange for the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(c) a person or persons shall be treated as having control of a corporation if under
the income tax laws of the Contracting State in which the income arises the per-
son or persons could be treated as having direct or indirect control of the corpora-
tion for any purpose;
(d) notwithstanding subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, a corporation is presumed
to meet the requirements of subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article if the
corporation establishes that individuals who are: (i) citizens of the United States;
(ii) residents of a Contracting State; or (iii) residents of States that have income
tax conventions in force with the Contracting State from which relief from taxa-
tion is claimed and such conventions provide relief from taxation not less than the
relief from taxation claimed under this Convention; own directly more than 75
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of the corporation's stock
entitled to vote and more than 75 percent of the number of shares of each other
class of the corporation's stock;
(e) a corporation is presumed to meet the requirements of subparagraph (c) of
paragraph 1 of this Article, in particular, where:
(i) the reduction in tax claimed is not greater than the tax actually imposed by
the Contracting State of which the corporation is resident; or
(ii) the corporation is engaged in business operations in the Contracting State of
which it is resident and the relief from taxation claimed from the other Con-
tracting State is with respect to income which is incidental to or derived in con-
nection with such business.
Compare supra note 134, § 1 with text accompanying note 127.
13 Both the June and the December drafts used the phrase "shall not be entitled" in-
stead of "may not be entitled." Compare supra note 134 with supra note 99.
M, See supra note 134, at § 1(a).
1' Id. § 1(c).
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first two tests essentially are the same as the previous versions of
those requirements.
The third alternative requirement, the "control" test, is new and
requires that the treaty corporation show that it is not "con-
trolled" by third country residents.'4" This is a significant depar-
ture from all previous treaties which generally object to having
third country residents own, directly or indirectly, twenty-five per-
cent of the treaty corporation. First, the new requirement does not
use the words "capital" or "beneficial interest"; it instead specifi-
cally refers to voting and non-voting stock.14 1 Second, the Decem-
ber draft uses the word "control" instead of "ownership"."12 Third,
unlike the 1977 U.S. Model, the June draft, and the treaties with
Jamaica and Argentina, the December draft does not specifically
require that ownership of the shares be restricted to "individual"
residents. 143
The fourth departure involves the meaning of the word "con-
trolled". The December draft's use of the term "controlled" may
be interpreted in two ways. First, the draft indicates that the term
"controlled" is to be defined under the tax laws of the country in
which the income is generated.14 While the draft makes no refer-
ence to a specific percentage of ownership in this context, the
United States Internal Revenue Code defines the term "control" as
having "more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote. . . .,,4 If the Treasury
meant to adopt this fifty percent figure, it initiated a major depar-
ture from all previous treaties. Generally, all other Article 16 pro-
visions have limited third country residents to no more than a
twenty-five percent ownership."6 With the announcement of the
recently signed Protocol with Denmark, the Treasury has shown
that it is willing to use the fifty percent figure. 4 7 In effect, the
Treasury has indicated that the permissible third country owner-
ship ratio may be raised from one-fourth to almost one-half.
The second possible interpretation of the term "controlled" fol-
"9 Id. § 1(b).
140 Id.
"4 See infra note 143, at § 2(d).
142 Id. § 1(b).
Compare id. with supra notes 75, 81, 99, 121 and accompanying text.
14' See supra note 134, at § 2(d).
141 I.R.C. § 957(a)(1976).
" See, e.g., supra note 75.
141 See supra note 89; see infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
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lows traditional Article 16 guidelines. The December draft indi-
cates that a company is not "controlled" by third country residents
when more than seventy-five percent of the company is owned by a
permitted group of persons.14 " The permitted owners under this
provision are either United States citizens; United States or treaty
country residents, since "individual" residents is not specified; or
residents of a third country. 4 9
Another indication that the Treasury is retreating from its tough
June draft position is the absence of the "preferred tax rate" and
the "prohibited payment" requirements in the December draft.' 50
The "preferred tax rate" was dropped from both the Jamaica" 1
and the Argentina152 treaties. By omitting this requirement from
the December draft the Treasury verified that while the "preferred
tax rate" test was a major concern during the formative years of
Article 16,'" the test was no longer a part of United States inter-
national tax policy.
The absence of the "prohibited payment" requirement from the
December draft indicates that the Treasury has decided to follow
the Senate's leadership. Despite the inclusion of a "prohibited pay-
ment requirement in the June draft " and in the treaty with Ja-
maica 5" the Senate's version of Article 16, as included in the Ar-
gentina treaty, 56 does not contain a "prohibited payment"
requirement.
In conclusion, the December draft represents a major retreat
from the June draft and a substantial change of this country's in-
ternational tax policy. Not only has the Treasury moved from a
four-requirement test to a single-requirement test, the Treasury
also has indicated that it would permit the ratio of third country
ownership to be raised from one-fourth to almost one-half and that
it no longer advocates prohibition of the payment of interest and
royalties by treaty corporations to third country residents.
"" See supra note 134.
149 Id.
180 Id.
'5' See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
." See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153 See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text.
18, See supra note 99.
15 See supra note 116.
' See supra note 127.
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D. Treaties Reported after the Announcement of the December
1981 Draft
After the announcement of the December draft, the United
States signed four additional tax treaties or protocols: the treaties
with New Zealand and Australia, 17 and the protocols with Ca-
nada' 58 and Denmark.I5 9
1. The 1982 Tax Treaty with New Zealand
The 1951 New Zealand treaty did not contain an Article 16 pro-
vision. °60 In July 1982, however, the Treasury and New Zealand
signed a new treaty that contains an Article 16.161 New Zealand's
Article 16 is a mixture of fragments from the June and December
drafts. As do all treaties since the June draft, the New Zealand
provision uses the phrase "shall not be entitled.' 62 In contrast to
the December draft, however, the New Zealand treaty applies to all
benefits and to all persons other than individuals.16 3 The treaty
follows the December draft in that it requires the treaty corpora-
tion to meet only one of three tests: the "stock exchange" test,164
157 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Aug. 6, 1982, United States-Australia,
- U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) V 402A (Aug. 6, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Australia Convention]. The 1982 treaty with Australia contained an
Article 16 provision which was similar to the Article 16 proposed in the New Zealand treaty,
discussed infra notes 160-78 and accompanying text. Consistent with other recent treaties,
the "preferred tax rate" and the "prohibited payments" requirements were absent from the
Australia treaty. Australia Convention, supra.
158 Protocol Amending the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income Signed at Wash-
ington on Sept. 26, 1980, June 14, 1983, United States-Canada, __ U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
-, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1317n (June 14, 1983). The Canadian protocol
simply states that benefits under the treaty will be denied to investment corporations and to
trusts where the owners of the corporations or the beneficiaries of the trusts are third coun-
try residents. Id. art. 29, § 6.
1 1983 Denmark Protocol, supra note 89.
160 Convention between the United States and New Zealand, Jan. 1, 1951, United States-
New Zealand, 2 U.S.T. 2379, T.I.A.S. No. 2360.
101 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, July 23, 1982, United States-New Zea-
land, - U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. __, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 5902A (July 23,
1982) [hereinafter cited as New Zealand Convention].
162 Id.
"' Compare the New Zealand Convention, id. with the June 1981 draft of Article 16,
supra note 99; the 1981 Jamaica Protocol, art. 17, supra note 116 and accompanying text;
the 1981 Argentina Treaty, see supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text; and the Decem-
ber 1981 Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model, art. 16, see supra notes 134-56 and accompanying
text.
164 See supra note 161. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the New Zea-
land Convention explained:
Under the [stock exchange] test, a company that is a resident of one of the coun-
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the "business purpose" test,165 or the "ownership" test.' The first
two tests as promulgated in the treaty with New Zealand are basi-
cally the same as other previous "stock exchange" or "business
purpose" requirements. The "ownership" test, however, has ele-
ments of both the June and the December drafts. The most impor-
tant element is the New Zealand treaty's use of the more tradi-
tional seventy-five percent figure instead of the fifty percent figure
announced in the December draft.' Using the seventy-five per-
cent figure, a treaty corporation is not entitled to the treaty bene-
fits unless more than seventy-five percent of the taxpayer's benefi-
cial interest (June draft language), or more than seventy-five
percent of each class of the company's shares, (December draft
language) is owned by a permitted group of owners (December
draft language). a68 The permitted group of owners is essentially the
same group outlined in the December draft:6 9 resident individuals
of the United States and New Zealand (the December draft is not
limited to individuals), United States citizens, companies whose
shares are regularly traded in recognized exchanges, and the treaty
countries themselves. 70
In addition to combining aspects of the June and December
drafts, the New Zealand treaty contains unprecedented language
requiring consultations between treaty countries where a treaty
tries and that has substantial and regular trading in its principal class of stock on
a recognized stock exchange in the United States or New Zealand is entitled to the
benefits of the treaty regardless of where its actual owners reside.
S. REP. No. 15, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1983).
'e See supra note 161. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that:
Under the [business purpose] test, denial of treaty benefits does not occur if it is
determined that the acquisition, ownership and maintenance of an entity that is a
resident of the United States or New Zealand and the conduct of its operations
did not have as a principal purpose the purpose of obtaining benefits under the
proposed treaty. Accordingly, the provision will not apply if there was no treaty
shopping motive for forming the company and if its operation does not have as
one of its principal purposes the purpose of obtaining the treaty benefits.
S. REP. No. 15, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1983).
1" See New Zealand Convention, supra note 161.
167 Compare the New Zealand Convention, supra note 161 with the December 1981 Draft
of the 1977 U.S. Model, supra notes 134-56 and accompanying text.
'" This interpretation of the New Zealand Convention, supra note 161, incorporates both
the "taxpayer's beneficial interest" clause of the 1981 June Draft, supra note 99, and the
"permitted group of owners" of company shares language of the December draft. December
1981 Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model, supra notes 18 and 134.
" See December 1981 Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model, supra notes 134-56 and accompany-
ing text.
170 New Zealand Convention, supra note 161.
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benefit is to be denied. Also included in the New Zealand treaty is
a clause limiting treaty benefits obtained under a trust set up as a
scheme to acquire such benefits.1 71
The proposed treaty with New Zealand contains neither the
"preferred tax rate" requirement, 72 which was absent from the
treaties with Jamaica 7  and Argentina 7 and from the December
draft, 75 nor the "prohibited payments" requirement, 7 which was
omitted from the Argentina treaty177 and the December draft. 7 8
2. The 1983 Protocol with Denmark
As is the case with the New Zealand and the Australia treaties,
the 1983 Denmark Protocol contains a mixture of some of the gen-
eral elements found in the June and the December drafts. 79 The
most significant elements of the Denmark Article 16 provision,
however, are the tests or requirements that the treaty corporation
must meet to enjoy the benefits under the treaty. The Denmark
Protocol marks the appearance of a new version of the "prohibited
payments" requirement. 80 Like the December draft, the protocol
171 Id.
172 Id.
171 See 1981 Jamaica Protocol, supra note 81; see also supra note 116 and accompanying
text.
171 See 1981 Argentina Treaty, supra notes 122 and 127.
'75 December 1981 Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model, supra notes 18 and 134.
"" New Zealand Convention, supra note 161.
177 1981 Argentina Treaty, supra notes 122 and 127.
178 December 1981 Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model, supra notes 18 and 134.
171 1983 Denmark Protocol, supra note 89. For example, the Denmark Protocol's Article
17 applies to all treaty benefits, and to all taxpayers except individuals. Id. It contains the
phrase "shall not be entitled", and a clause providing for consultation between the two
countries if treaty benefits are to be denied. Id. § 4. The paragraph which provides for
consultation between the two countries before treaty benefits are denied also appears in the
recently ratified New Zealand treaty. Both provisions should be given the same interpreta-
tion. The Treasury Department's Technical Explanation of the New Zealand Convention
explained that this provision:
provides that the competent authorities shall consult each other before Treaty
benefits are denied under this Article. This consultation obligation is intended to
benefit the governments of the two Contracting States; any failure of the compe-
tent authorities in a particular case so to consult does not result in the grant of
benefits under the Convention where those benefits would otherwise be denied,
e.g. by reason of this Article.
2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 5903D (1983).
180 1983 Denmark Protocol, supra note 89. The language of the Denmark Protocol reads
as follows:
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a Contracting State
shall not be entitled under this Convention to relief from taxation in the other
Contracting State unless:
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with Denmark indicates that the treaty corporation needs only to
meet one of the three following requirements: the "stock ex-
change" requirement, 181 the "business purpose" requirement,1 8 2 or
the "ownership/prohibited payments" requirement.183
The first two requirements are the same as any other "stock ex-
change" or "business purpose" requirement; however, the third re-
quirement is new. The new provision in the Denmark Protocol pro-
vides that the treaty taxpayer will not be entitled to the treaty
benefits unless it can meet an "ownership" test and a "prohibited
payment" test.18 4 The "ownership" test requires that more than
fifty percent of the beneficial interest or more than fifty percent of
the company shares be owned directly or'indirectly by a permitted
group of individuals. 185 While the permitted group of owners is the
same group indicated in the New Zealand and Australia treaties'
provisions,18 6 the Denmark Protocol was the first time the Trea-
sury specifically used the fifty percent figure.8 7
In the June draft and the treaties with Jamaica, Argentina, New
Zealand, and Australia, the Treasury used the "more than seventy-
(a)(i) more than 50 percent of the beneficial interest in such person (or in the case
of a company, more than 50 percent of the number of shares of each class of the
company's shares) is owned, directly or indirectly, by any combination of one or
more of:
(A) individuals who are residents of one of the Contracting States;
(B) citizens of the United States;
(C) companies as described in subparagraph (b); and
(D) one of the Contracting States, its political subdivisions or local authorities and
(ii) in the case of relief from taxation under Articles 10 (Dividends), 11 (Interest),
12 (Royalties), or 22 (Other Income), not more than 50 percent of the gross in-
come of such person is used to make payments of interest to persons who are
other than persons described in clauses (A) through (D) of subparagraph (a)(i),
whether directy or indirectly; or
(b) it is a company which is a resident of a Contracting State and in whose princi-
pal class of shares there is a substantial and regular trading on a recognized stock
exchange.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the establishment, acquisition and maintenance
of such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as a principal pur-
pose the purpose of obtaining benefits under the Convention.
There is also a paragraph 3 defining the term "recognized stock exchange" and a paragraph
4 providing for consultation between the two countries before tax benefits are denied.
Id.
:8, See supra note 180, at § 1(b).
182 Id. § 2.
:83 Id. §§ (a)(i), I 1(a)(i).
184 Id.
181 Id. § 1(a)(i).
See supra notes 168 and 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180.
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five percent" figure. '88 The December draft did allude to a "more
than fifty percent" figure by the use of the word "control"'8 9 but,
in the Denmark Protocol the Treasury left no doubt that it was
willing to raise the permissible third country resident ownership
ratio from one-fourth to almost one-half.
At the same time, however, the Treasury was not prepared to
permit outright treaty shopping as was indicated by the reappear-
ance of a new version of the "prohibited payment" requirement in
the Denmark Protocol. The Denmark Protocol required that when
the benefits in question involve dividends, interest, royalties, or
other income, the treaty corporation may not use more than fifty
percent of its gross income for interest payments except to the per-
mitted group of owners. 90
The "prohibited payment" requirement first appeared in the
June draft. While the requirement also appeared in the Jamaican
treaty, the Senate apparently did not approve of its inclusion. No
reference to the "prohibited payment" requirement was made at
the Bangladesh ratification hearings, and the requirement was not
included in the Senate-created Argentina provision. The Treasury
apparently saw the omission of the requirement as a signal and
omitted the requirement from the December draft and from the
treaties with New Zealand and Australia. This interplay between
the Treasury and the Senate as to whether the "prohibited pay-
ment" requirement should be an element of the United States in-
ternational tax policy signals that the two parties have yet to agree
on a definitive model treaty provision.
Undoubtedly, the newly proposed "prohibited payments" re-
quirement is less restrictive than its predecessor. The new require-
ment specifically permits that up to fifty percent of the treaty cor-
poration's gross income may be used for interest payments to third
country residents. In addition, the new provision does not restrict
the payment of dividends and royalties to third country residents.
3. Recent Activity
Recent treaties and protocols indicate that the "prohibited pay-
ment" protocol is not being readily adopted. In September 1983,
188 See supra notes 99, 116, 127, 168, and 157.
18. See December 1981 Draft of the 1977 U.S. Model, supra note 134; see notes 144-47
and accompanying text.
'" 1983 Denmark Protocol, supra notes 89 and 180.
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the United States and France signed a protocol191 which later was
amended by another protocol signed on January 17, 1984;192
neither protocol contained a "prohibited payment" requirement.
The United States signed a new treaty and protocol with Italy on
April 17, 1984.193 Under Article 2 of the Protocol, third country
residents may own up to 49.99 percent of an Italian corporation
and still utilize the benefits of the treaty.19' Like the French proto-
col, the Italian protocol does not contain a "prohibited payment"
requirement. 19 5
On May 8, 1984, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ap-
proved the Danish and the French protocols.""6 On June 28, 1984,
the Senate approved the French treaty and protocol.19 7 Without
explanation, however, no vote was taken on the Danish protocol. In
contrast to the protocols signed with France and Italy, the Danish
protocol contained the "prohibited payment" requirement that
limits the payments of dividends, interest, and royalties to third
country residents. 9 8 The Senate's failure to vote on the Danish
protocol might be an indication that the "prohibited payment" re-
quirement is not being readily accepted.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the history of Article 16, it is obvious that the Trea-
sury may announce a third draft of Article 16. The new version
should be substantially different from the version proposed in June
1981. It is expected that the third version will include the following
provisions:
1. It will limit all benefits under the treaty. This limitation
would be far more encompassing than the present wording found
in the 1977 Model. Such a change was first proposed in the June
1981 draft, adopted by the Senate in its reservation to the Argen-
tina treaty, confirmed by the Treasury in the language of the De-
cember draft, and confirmed by the Senate in the recent ratifica-
tion of the treaties with New Zealand and Australia.
2. It will use mandatory language such as the treaty taxpayer's
191 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) I 2836B (Sept. 19, 1983).
l1 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 9930 (Jan. 17, 1984).
:93 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 4328 (Apr. 17, 1984).
' Id. $ 4336B.
195 Id.
1" 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) Report Letter 388 (May 21, 1984).
l97 24 TAx NoTEs 233 (1984).
18 1983 Denmark Protocol, supra note 89; see supra note 180.
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"shall not be entitled" to the treaty benefits. While the 1977
Model uses the "may tax" optional language, this language has
only been used in a few treaties.
3. It will apply to all taxpayers other than individuals. While the
1977 Model only applies to companies, the Argentine reservation
and the ratification of the treaties with New Zealand and Australia
indicate that there is support in the Senate for the more encom-
passing language found in the June draft. Additionally, in view of
the two most recent treaties, the third or final draft of Article 16
can be expected to contain some language concerning trusts and
how the benefits of such trusts could be denied to beneficiaries.
4. It will stipulate that one of three possible requirements be sat-
isfied. As a review of the treaties indicate, there definitely will be a
"stock exchange" and a "business purpose" requirement. In light
of the August protocol with Denmark, however, there is some un-
certainty as to the final form of the third requirement.
The third requirement undoubtedly will involve some kind of an
"ownership" or "control" test. Traditionally, the Senate has rati-
fied treaties containing a clause limiting ownership or control by
third country residents to one-fourth of the treaty corporation. At
the same time, however, the Senate appears to oppose a "prohib-
ited payment" requirement. The Treasury has proposed raising the
percentage from twenty-five to about fifty percent. The price to
pay for raising the percentage of ownership as such is a "prohib-
ited payment" clause. Thus, the Senate must decide whether it is
necessary to raise the traditional percentage from twenty-five to
almost fifty percent at the expense of including a "prohibited pay-
ment" clause.
The Treasury clearly is retreating from the proposed June draft;
however, such a retreat does not show that the Treasury will con-
done treaty shopping. The change in position does indicate that
the Treasury is willing to re-examine its original views on treaty
shopping and that it might even be willing to permit some treaty
shopping. The omissions also indicate that the Treasury feels that
it no longer needs to justify its anti-treaty shopping policy based
on its original concern over the loopholes provided in tax laws of
foreign countries. The Treasury no longer needs to present argu-
ments in support of the adoption of Article 16 provisions in tax
treaties, because the Senate has indicated that the policy behind
Article 16 is "the prevention of unintended benefits."
The Treasury and the Senate have demonstrated their faith that
the United States, with its relatively stable government and econ-
19841 323
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omy, will continue to attract foreign capital from around the globe
regardless of whether the foreign capital can be channelled through
treaty countries. As long as the Treasury and Senate are convinced
that the United States will continue to attract foreign capital re-
gardless of our international tax policy, the United States govern-
ment will continue its anti-treaty shopping efforts.
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